Restaurant First Floor im Admiral Filmpalast - Gaststätte / Restaurant in Nürnberg - hier finden Sie neben Öffnungszeiten und Angebot auch alle Kommentare. wurde der Admiral-Palast eröffnet, mit Sitzplätzen. Wie so viele Kinos wurde es in den 80ern in 5 Säle geteilt. nochmall renoviert wurde es Hier finden Sie die Details über das Kino Admiral Filmpalast in Nürnberg. Eine aktuelle Programmübersicht, Öffnungszeiten, Telefonnummer und die komplette.
Admiral Palast Filmtheater GmbH & Co. KGgesund und zu Hause – und bald sehen wir uns dann alle wieder im Kino! Eure FILMSTARTS-Redaktion. Kinos in der Nähe von Cineplex Admiral Nürnberg. Aktuelles Kinoprogramm für Admiral Filmpalast · Nürnberg (Lorenz) · Kinoprogramm · ratatouille-banda.com Diese Webseite verwendet Cookies, um die Bedienfreundlichkeit zu erhöhen. Hier finden Sie unsere Datenschutzbestimmungen. OK. Kino · Filmprogramm.
Admiral Nürnberg Filmprogramm VideoS.P.A.C.E on Tour - Admiral Filmpalast in Nürnberg
Herr Musikdirektor nicht fur richtig fand, von Dieter Goodgame Big Farm.De rezensiert. - FILMPROGRAMMIbiza Salatteller mit 3 gebackenen Mozzarellasticks, Putenbruststreifen, Joghurtdressing und Kräuterdip. Bercuson, Roulette Tisch Bild Herwig, Holger His wishes were frustrated by a series of mishaps. We fight to the last shell. Carls openly displayed his Gutes Mmo at the lack of communication, believing Lütjens to be hesitant.
Wer sich Admiral Nürnberg bewusst ist, in der Geschichte Poker Odds Calculator James-Bond-Reihe ist, von vielen Menschen zu trГumende. - Alle Vorstellungen heute im Cineplex Admiral Filmpalast NürnbergDer Grund hierfür ist unfreundlicher Service um durchschnittliche Speisen. Weitere Infos. Portugiesisch 2. Low Cost Private Transfer vom Flughafen Italienisch 2.
Date of experience: February Helpful Share. I like Admiral because of its location. In the middle of the Pedistrian n Shoping Area and only a few blocks away from the 'Lorenzi' Admiral makes this Cinema very tempting.
Eventhough it isnt the most modern one in town, but surely Admiral could get along very well with its competitors. For Tix, you could have it reserved through their convinient phone and online booking.
Date of experience: July Wanda L wrote a review Jul Lisberg, Germany 2 contributions 1 helpful vote. Horrible Waitress and Mediocre Food at the cafe.
DON'T waste your time going here!! I ordered the apple strudel served ice-cream and whipped cream. The strudel was full of apple peelings and was old with just a tablespoon of both the ice-cream and whip cream.
The waitress was ill mannered and rude the whole time. We called her over when we were ready to pay and she asked We said separate please We told her it was fine There are too many great cafe's and bakeries in Germany to have to deal with this As an ex-submariner, Dönitz did not like to contemplate the thought of a man who had done well heading out to sea, perhaps never to return, without being rewarded or receiving recognition.
Dönitz acknowledged where decorations were concerned there was no red tape and that awards were "psychologically important.
Intelligence played an important role in the Battle of the Atlantic. At the height of the battle in mid some 2, signals were sent from the U-Boats at sea.
The Germans did not suspect the Allies had identified the codes broken by B-Dienst. The Germans were never as open to new ideas or thinking of war in intelligence terms.
According to one analyst BdU "lacked imagination and intellectual daring" in the naval war. Just 10 transports were sunk in November and December On 7 May , the Royal Navy captured the German Arctic meteorological vessel München and took its Enigma machine intact, this allowed the Royal Navy to decode U-boat radio communications in June The papers were the only stores destroyed by the crew.
Beginning in August , Bletchley Park operatives could decrypt signals between Dönitz and his U-boats at sea without any restriction.
Even so, the U-boats achieved their best success against the convoys in March , due to an increase in U-boat numbers, and the protection of the shipping lines was in jeopardy.
Due to the cracked M4 and the use of radar, the Allies began to send air and surface reinforcements to convoys under threat. The shipping lines were secured, which came as a great surprise to Dönitz.
Signals security aroused Dönitz's suspicions during the war. On 12 January German supply submarine U arrived nautical miles west of Freetown , well clear of convoy lanes.
It was scheduled to rendezvous with an Italian submarine, until intercepted by a warship. The German captain's report coincided with reports of a decrease in sightings and a period of tension between Dönitz and Raeder.
Despite several investigations, the conclusion of the BdU staff was that Engima was impenetrable. His signals officer responded to the U incident with answers ranging from coincidence, direction finding to Italian treachery.
He concluded that there was "convincing evidence" that, after an "exhaustive investigation" that the Allied codebreakers had been reading high level communications.
Dönitz intended to strike close to shore in American and Canadian waters and prevent the convoys—the most effective anti—U-boat system—from ever forming.
Dönitz was determined to take advantage of Canadian and American unpreparedness before the situation changed. The problem inhibiting Dönitz's plan was a lack of boats.
On paper he had , but in January , 99 were still undergoing sea trials and 59 were assigned to training flotillas, leaving only on war operations.
Therefore, on 1 January Dönitz had a fighting strength of 16—25 in the Atlantic six near to Iceland on "Norwegian operations" , three in the Arctic Ocean , three in the Mediterranean and three operating west of Gibraltar.
Unknown to him, ULTRA had read his Enigma signals and knew the position, size, and intentions of his boats, down to the date the operation was scheduled to begin.
The attacks, when they came, were not a surprise. Lawrence , a series of battles which lasted into The global average was The solitary kill was achieved by the RCAF.
Canadian operations, as with American efforts, were a failure during this year. Along with conventional U-boat operations Dönitz authorised clandestine activities in Canadian waters, including spying, mine-laying, and recovery of German prisoners of war as Dönitz wished to extract information from rescued submariners concerning Allied tactics.
All of these things tied down Canadian military power and imposed industrial, fiscal, and psychological costs. The impunity with which U-boats carried out these operations in Canadian waters into provided a propaganda effect.
Even with operational problems great success was achieved in American waters. From January to July , Dönitz's submarines were able to attack un-escorted ships off the United States' east coast and in the Caribbean Sea; U-boats sank more ships and tonnage than at any other time in the war.
After a convoy system was introduced to protect the shipping, Dönitz shifted his U-boats back to the North Atlantic.
By the time improved American air and naval defences had driven German submarines from American shores, 5, Allied sailors had been killed for negligible losses in U-Boats.
The ensuing Battle of the Caribbean resulted in immediate dividends for U-boats. In a short time, at least transports had been destroyed or sunk.
The sinkings damaged inter-island trade substantially. Oil refinery production in region declined  while the tanker fleet suffered losses of up to ten percent within twenty-four hours.
The USN introduced effective convoy systems thereafter, ending the "carnage. Dönitz maintained his demands for the concentration of all his crews in the Atlantic.
As the military situation in North Africa and on the Eastern Front began to deteriorate Hitler diverted a number of submarines to the Battle of the Mediterranean  upon the suggestions of Admiral Eberhard Weichold.
Hitler felt compelled to act against Allied sea forces which were having an enormous impact on Axis supply lines to North Africa.
The decision defied logic, for a victory in the Atlantic would end the war in the Mediterranean. Dönitz had met his end as a submarine commander in the Mediterranean two decades earlier.
In Dönitz summed up his philosophy in one simple paragraph; "The enemy's shipping constitutes one single, great entity. It is therefore immaterial where a ship is sunk.
Once it has been destroyed it has to be replaced by a new ship; and that's that. BdU intelligence concluded the Americans could produce 15,, tons of shipping in and —two million tons under actual production figures.
Dönitz always calculated the worst-case scenario using the highest figures of enemy production potential. Some , tons per month needed to be sunk to win the war.
The "second happy time" reached a peak in June , with , tons sunk, up from , in May, , in April and the highest since the , tons sunk in March Nevertheless, there was still cause for optimism.
B-Dienst had cracked the convoy ciphers and by July he could call upon boats, operational, to conduct a renewed assault.
By October he had operational from Dönitz's force finally reached the desired number both he and Raeder had hoped for in The addition of a fourth rotor to the Enigma left radio detection the only way to gather intelligence on dispositions and intentions of the German naval forces.
German code breakers had their own success in the capture of the code book to Cipher Code Number 3 from a merchant ship.
It was a treble success for the BdU. Dönitz was content that he now had the naval power to extend U-boat operations to other areas aside the North Atlantic.
The Caribbean, Brazilian waters with the coast of West Africa designated operational theatres. Waters in the southern hemisphere to South Africa could also be attacked with the new Type IX submarine.
The strategy was sound and his tactical ideas were effective. The number of boats available allowed him to form Wolfpacks to comb convoy routes from east to west attacking one when found and pursuing it across the ocean.
The pack then refuelled from a U-boat tanker and worked from west to east. Raeder and the operations staff disputed the value in attacking convoys heading westward with empty cargo holds.
The tactics were successful but placed great strain on crews who spent up to eight days in constant action. November was a new high in the Atlantic.
The same month Dönitz suffered strategic defeat. His submarines failed to prevent Operation Torch , even with of them operating in the Atlantic.
Dönitz considered it a major self-inflicted defeat. Allied morale radically improved after the victories of Torch, the Second Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Stalingrad ; all occurred within days of one another.
The U-boat war was the only military success the Germans enjoyed at the end of the year. In a communique to the navy he announced his intentions to retain practical control of the U-boats and his desire to fight to the end for Hitler.
Dönitz's promotion earned Hitler his undying loyalty. For Dönitz, Hitler had given him a "true home-coming at last, to a country in which unemployment appeared to have been abolished, the class war no longer tore the nation apart, and the shame of defeat in was being expunged.
Hitler recognised his patriotism, professionalism but above all, his loyalty. Dönitz remained so, long after the war was lost. In so doing, he wilfully ignored the genocidal nature of the regime and claimed ignorance of the Holocaust.
In the last quarter of , 69 submarines had been commissioned taking the total number to , with operational. Dönitz's proposed expansion ran into difficulties experienced by all of his predecessors; the lack of steel.
The navy had no representation in or to Albert Speer 's armaments ministry for naval production was the only sphere not under his control.
Dönitz understood this worked against the navy because it lacked the elasticity to cope with breakdowns of production at any point, whereas the other services could make good production by compensating one sector at the expense of another.
Without any representatives the battle of priorities was left to Speer and Göring. Dönitz had the sense to place U-boat production under Speer on the provison 40 per month were completed.
New construction procedures, dispensing with prototypes and the abandonment of modifications reduced construction times from ,man hours to —, to meet Speer's quota.
In the spring , the Type XXI submarine was scheduled to reach frontline units. In however, the Combined Bomber Offensive complicated the planned production.
Dönitz and Speer were appalled by the destruction of Hamburg , a major construction site. The type VII remained the backbone of the fleet in At the end of , Dönitz was faced with the appearance of escort carriers , and long-range aircraft working with convoy escorts.
The Command was moderately successful after mid The loss of , tons of fuel in one convoy represented the most devastating loss percentage of the war—only two of nine tankers reached port.
The British 8th Army were forced to ration their fuel for a time, earning Dönitz the gratitude of the Afrika Korps.
It was agreed that until the defeat of Dönitz and his men, there could be no amphibious landings in continental Europe.
During January and February information was decrypted within 24 hours proving operationally useful, although this slipped at the end of the second month contributing to German interceptions.
In February the strength of Allied defences were an ominous sign for Dönitz. The battle of HX was ended upon the intervention of air power from Iceland.
Dönitz sent 20 boats to attack SC and both sides suffered heavy losses—11 merchants for three U-boats plus four damaged. It was "what both sides considered one of the hardest fought battles of the Atlantic war.
The majority of the ships sunk were by one crew, commanded by Siegfried von Forstner —he sank seven. The Admiralty later issued a report on the matter; "The Germans never came so near [to] disrupting communications between the new world and the old as in the first twenty days of March New Allied techniques, tactics and technology began to turn the tide.
By April U-boat morale was reaching a crisis point. Ominous for BdU was the sudden growth of Allied air power. The Allied command accepted that air cover over the mid-Atlantic was totally inadequate and had drawn attention to the fact that not one VLR Very Long Range aircraft was to be found at any Allied air base west of Iceland.
The Americans released Liberators for the North Atlantic. At the end of March 20 VLR aircraft were operational rising to 41 by mid-April, all of them flown by British crews.
Dönitz detected a drop in morale among his captains, as did the British. Dönitz encouraged his commanders to show a "hunter's instinct" and "warrior spirit" in the face of the air—surface support group threat.
Along with air power, the BdU was forced to contend with a large increase in available Allied convoy escorts which replenished their tanks from tankers in the convoys allowing escort across the ocean.
The official naval historian wrote, "The collapse of the enemy's offensive, when it came, was so sudden that it took him completely by surprise.
We now know that, in fact, a downward trend in the U-boats' recent accomplishments could have forewarned him, but was concealed from him by the exaggerated claims made by their commanders.
Encouraged by the isolated successes of anti-aircraft artillery installed on submarines, he ordered crews to stay on the surface and fight it out with the aircraft.
For the month of April Allied losses fell to 56 ships of , tons. Throughout the battles only two ships were sunk in convoy in the Atlantic while an air anti-submarine escort was present.
Allied air power determined where and when U-boats could move freely surfaced. It was the combination of convoy escorts and air power that made the Atlantic unsuitable for pack operations.
They forced a commander to dive to prevent the vehicle marking his position or attacking directly. Six of the ships were sunk; three were stragglers.
By 24 May, when Dönitz conceded defeat and withdrew the surviving crews from the field of battle, they had already lost 33 U-boats.
At the end of May it had risen to Consequently, the Allied success is described as decisive in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.
Defeat in the mid-Atlantic left Dönitz in a dilemma. The U-boats had proven unable to elude convoy escorts and attack convoys with success.
He was concerned about crew morale suffering from idleness and a loss of experience with the latest Allied developments in anti-submarine warfare.
Main article: Leipzig-class cruiser. Gardiner, Robert; Chesneau, Roger, eds. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, — Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Gröner, Erich German Warships: — I: Major Surface Vessels. Prien, Jochen Eutin, Germany: Struve-Druck. Rohwer, Jürgen Weal, John London, UK: Osprey Publishing.
Williamson, Gordon German Light Cruisers — Oxford: Osprey Publishing. Whitley, M. London: Conway Maritime Press. VI 23 : — VI 24 : — Leipzig -class cruisers.
Leipzig Nürnberg. Admiral Makarov ex- Nürnberg. List of light cruisers of Germany. Namespaces Article Talk.
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Leipzig -class cruiser. Wikimedia Commons has media related to Nürnberg ship, Jump to: navigation , search. Cruiser U.
Tier VI. Main Battery. Rotation Speed 7. Firing Range HE Shell mm Spr. HE Shell Weight AP Shell mm P.
AP Shell Weight Secondary Armament 1. Firing Range 4. HE Shell 88 mm Spr. Torpedo Tubes. Rate of Fire 0.
AA Defense. Average Damage per Second Firing Range 3. Firing Range 2. Rudder Shift Time 7. Surface Detectability Range Air Detectability Range 5.
Secondary Gun Turrets pcs. AA Mounts pcs.Nürnberg returned with news of the Allied capture of German Samoa, which had taken place on 29 August. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailed to Apia to investigate the situation.  Spee had hoped to catch a British or Australian warship by surprise, but upon his arrival on 14 September, he found no warships in the harbor. . Admiral Otto Backenköhler was Lütjens' chief of staff at the Fleet-Command (24 October – 31 July ). A year later, their first son, Gerhard, was born on 31 August in Swinemünde. The marriage produced a second son, named Günther after his father, on 28 August in Berlin. Admiral Filmpalast @admiralfilmpalast @filmpalast FILMPROGRAMM. Café. First Floor. Skybar. AUF EINEN BLICK. Anfahrt. Damit Sie uns nicht verfehlen, haben wir alle. SMS Nürnberg ("His Majesty's Ship Nürnberg"), named after the Bavarian city of Nuremberg, was a Königsberg-class light cruiser built for the German Imperial Navy (Kaiserliche Marine). Her sisters included Königsberg, Stettin, and Stuttgart. Nürnberg trials, Nürnberg also spelled Nuremberg, series of trials held in Nürnberg, Germany, in –46, in which former Nazi leaders were indicted and tried as war criminals by the International Military Tribunal. Diese Webseite verwendet Cookies, um die Bedienfreundlichkeit zu erhöhen. Hier finden Sie unsere Datenschutzbestimmungen. OK. Kino · Filmprogramm. Admiral Filmpalast Kino, Nürnberg | Kino | Ticketreservierung, Kinobeschreibung und Bewertung. Wer Filme liebt, ist im Admiral Filmpalast richtig. Das moderne Kino bietet Top-Filmgenuss. Hier erhalten Sie alle Infos über das Cineplex Kino Nürnberg. Admiral Filmpalast - Nürnberg, Nürnberg. Gefällt Mal. Königstraße 11, Nürnberg, Impressum: ratatouille-banda.com Admiral Filmpalast @admiralfilmpalast @filmpalast AKTUELLES FILMPROGRAMM. Filmprogramm. Nächste Woche Vielen Dank, dass Sie unsere Seite mit dem Firefox öffnen. Bitte deaktivieren Sie die Blockierung von Seitenelementen in den Einstellungen. × FILME & EVENTS. The Menu for Admiral from Nürnberg, category:category can be view here or added. Or look up more Restaurants in Nürnberg. 54 reviews of Admiral-Filmpalast "While staying in Nuremberg we are here and hung out for hours having snacks and coffee. Our waiters were very hard working and kind to us. My wife had an amazing grilled chicken sandwich on the best roll eve! The quality of produce was perfection.."4/5(54).